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INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
issued sixteen trademark decisions1 and designated nine of those 
sixteen decisions as precedential.2  These cases consist of appeals 
from the United States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board3 (TTAB 
or “the Board”) and federal district courts.4 
Of the nine precedential trademark decisions, six dealt with 
primarily substantive issues5 while three involved primarily procedural 
                                                          
 1. In re Sones, No. 2009-1140, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1118 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2009); Am. Rice, Inc. v. Dunmore Prop. S.A., No. 
2009-1313, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25467 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2009); In re 
1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 92 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding Inc.,  
581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Inca Textiles, LLC, 
No. 2008-1443, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19656 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 2, 2009); In re Bose 
Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Cipriani Group, 
Inc. v. Orient-Express Hotels Inc., 331 F. App’x 749 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam);  
In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532 (Fed. Cir. 2009);  
In re Northland Organic Foods Corp., 337 F. App’x 878 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re 
Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 335 F. App’x 966, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009); In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009); Bishop v. Flournoy, 319 F. App’x 897 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Aycock Eng’g, Inc. 
v. Airflite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Holt’s Co. 
v. Virgin Enter. Ltd., 309 F. App’x 412 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 2. In re Sones, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118; 
1800Mattress.com, 586 F.3d 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682; Cold War Museum, 586 
F.3d 1352, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626; Vita-Mix Corp., 581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1340; Bose, 580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938; In re Hotels.com, 573 
F.3d 1300, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532; In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218; In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1489; Aycock Eng’g, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301. 
 3. In re Sones, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, at *1, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119; 
Am. Rice, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25467, at *1; In re 1800Mattress.com, 586 F.3d at  
1360–61, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682; Cold War Museum, 586 F.3d at 1354, 92 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627; In re Inca Textiles, LLC, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19656, at 
*1; In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d at 1242, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938; Cipriani Group, 
Inc., 331 F. App’x at 749; In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1301, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1533; Northland Organic Foods Corp., 337 F. App’x at 878; In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 
571 F.3d at 1172, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219; In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1349,  
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490; Bishop, 319 F. App’x at 897; Aycock Eng’g Inc., 560 F.3d 
at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302; Holt’s Co., 309 F. App’x at 412. 
 4. Vita-Mix Corp., 581 F.3d at 1320, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342; McZeal, 335  
F. App’x at 966, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316. 
 5. In re 1800Mattress.com, 586 F.3d 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682 
(genericness); In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938 (fraud on 
the trademark office); In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d 1300, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532 
(genericness); In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218 
(false association); Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks); Aycock Eng’g Inc., 560 F.3d 1350,  
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301 (use in commerce). 
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issues.6  As is typical, the Federal Circuit largely adopted the findings 
of the lower tribunals, affirming nine of the sixteen decisions on 
appeal.7 
While the Federal Circuit largely affirmed the TTAB in 2009,  
the court also redirected the Board in several decisions that, in effect, 
eased the burden of trademark owners and the trademark bar.8 
In In re Bose Corp.,9 the Federal Circuit held that a trademark owner 
commits fraud on the Trademark Office when obtaining or 
maintaining a registration only when the owner knowingly makes a 
false, material representation with the intent to deceive the Office.10  
In contrast, the TTAB had been employing a lower, constructive 
knowledge standard for finding fraud.11 
Also of note, in In re Sones,12 the Circuit loosened the validity 
requirements for web-based specimens for goods, finding that 
Internet specimens do not need to show a photograph of the goods 
to be a valid specimen of use.13  Prior to the Circuit’s In re Sones 
decision, the Trademark Office had been requiring trademark 
applicants submitting web-based specimens to provide a photograph 
of the goods wherein the goods are displayed in close proximity to 
the applied-for mark and ordering information.14 
                                                          
 6. In re Sones, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118 
(statement of use requirements for web-based specimens for goods); Cold War 
Museum, 586 F.3d 1352, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (admissibility of prosecution file 
evidence); Vita-Mix Corp., 581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (common law 
rights). 
 7. Am. Rice, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25467, at *1; In re 1800Mattress.com, 586 F.3d 
at 1361, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682; Inca Textiles, LLC, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 
19656, at *1; Cipriani Group, Inc., 331 F. App’x at 749; Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1301,  
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533; Northland Organic Foods Corp., 337 F. App’x at 878; 
Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d at 1172, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219; Aycock Eng’g, 
Inc., 560 F.3d at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302; Holt’s Co., 309 F. App’x at 412. 
 8. See, e.g., In re Sones, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, at *1, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
at 1119 (weakening requirements for web-based specimens of use in commerce for 
goods); Cold War Museum, 586 F.3d at 1356, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628 
(mandating that a trademark prosecution record is automatically part of the record 
in TTAB proceedings); In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d at 1242, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1938 (raising the bar for finding fraud on the Trademark Office); In re Spirits Int’l, 
563 F.3d at 1349, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (heightening the burden on the 
Trademark Office to find a mark primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive); Bishop, 319 F. App’x at 900 (admissions against interest in a TTAB 
proceeding might support standing to bring an opposition proceeding). 
 9. 580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 10. Id. at 1244–45, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940–41. 
 11. Id. at 1244, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. 
 12. No. 2009-1140, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118 
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2009). 
 13. Id. at *17, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123. 
 14. Id. at *7–12, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121–22. 
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Each of the Federal Circuit’s 2009 trademark decisions are 
discussed in detail below. 
I.  SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES  
A.  Fraud on the Trademark Office  
In perhaps the most stinging rebuke on the TTAB of 2009,  
the Circuit censured the Board for overusing the f-word:  fraud.   
In In re Bose Corp.,15 the Circuit reversed the Board’s decision finding 
fraud on the Trademark Office based on an inaccurate registration 
renewal document.16 
Bose Corporation, the maker of popular high-end electronics 
equipment including the WAVE line that once encompassed audio 
tape recorders and players, brought an opposition proceeding 
against Hexawave, Inc.’s application for HEXAWAVE in connection 
with various electronic goods.17 
Hexawave, Inc. counterclaimed that Bose was no longer making 
audio tape recorders and players under the WAVE mark, and as such, 
had committed fraud on the Trademark Office in 2001 when it 
renewed its registration for WAVE in connection with audio tape 
recorders and players.18 
The TTAB explicitly found that Bose stopped manufacturing audio 
tape recorders and players in the late 1990s and that Bose’s general 
counsel knew the company had stopped manufacture of these goods, 
but still chose to sign the registration renewal19 (which asserts that the 
mark is still in use for these goods).20  Because the TTAB held that 
Bose had committed fraud, it voided Bose’s entire registration.21 
The Circuit began its opinion in In re Bose with a veritable homily 
on trademark fraud jurisprudence.  The court explained that a 
moving party in cancellation proceedings must prove its fraud 
charges “to the hilt,” with clear and convincing evidence.22  The court 
further noted that fraud in renewal occurs when “an applicant 
                                                          
 15. 580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 16. Id. at 1242, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
 17. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938–39. 
 18. Id. at 1242–43, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 19. Bose argued that because customers still had their audio tape recorders and 
players repaired by Bose, and because the repairs necessitated transport back and 
forth to consumers, Bose’s General Counsel reasonably believed the goods were still 
within the stream of interstate commerce, and accordingly no deception towards the 
Office was intended.  Id. at 1242, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 20. Id. at 1242, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 21. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
 22. Id. at 1243, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
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knowingly makes false, material representations of fact in connection 
with his application.”23  Absent a showing of knowingly making 
inaccurate or misleading statements, even a material 
misrepresentation does not constitute fraud under the Trademark 
Act warranting cancellation of the registration at issue.24  The Board 
had largely (and correctly in the Circuit’s eyes) required a showing 
that any deception effected on the Trademark Office was willful in 
order to constitute fraud on the Office.25  The Circuit contrasted the 
willful standard with a stricter standard requiring proof of intent or 
specific intent to deceive before cancelling a trademark registration, 
noting that five of the eleven circuits had required that a cancellation 
movant provide evidence of specific intent to deceive the Trademark 
Office.26  However, the court noted that the Board gradually began to 
chip away at the higher standard of fraud27 to implement a lower, 
                                                          
 23. See id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939 (citing Torres v. Cantine Torresella 
S.r.l., 808 F.2d 46, 48 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (emphasis added). 
 24. See id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939–40 (citing King Auto., Inc. v. Speedy 
Muffler King, Inc., 667 F.2d 1008, 1011 n.4, 212 U.S.P.Q. 801, 803 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 
1981)). 
 25. See id. at 1243, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940 (following “the statute and case 
law, the Board had consistently and correctly acknowledged that there is a material 
legal distinction between a false representation and a fraudulent one, the latter 
involving an intent to deceive, whereas the former may be occasioned by a 
misunderstanding, an inadvertence, a mere negligent omission, or the like” (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)). 
 26. Id. at 1243–44, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. 
 27. The Circuit chastised the Board for ignoring the “long line of precedents 
from the Board itself, from [the Circuit], and from other circuit courts” requiring 
specific intent to deceive in order to find fraudulent conduct in Medinol and the  
post-Medinol cancellation proceedings.  Id. at 1244, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.  
However, from whence was this lowered “should have known” standard born?  
Although the Circuit in In re Bose dances around it, the Board based its Medinol 
standard on the Circuit’s handling of Torres, 808 F.2d 46, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1483.  
In Torres, a wine and spirits manufacturer had obtained a composite word and design 
mark registration for use in connection with wine, vermouth, and champagne.   
Id. at 47, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.  The Registrant subsequently changed the 
design element in its mark and stopped making sparkling wine and spirits under the 
mark.  Id., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.  However, when the Registrant tried to 
renew his registration, he submitted a sworn declaration with his renewal application 
asserting that he was still using the original registered mark in connection with wine, 
sparkling wine, and spirits, and as his specimen of use, he attached an old label 
showing the registered mark as an example of how the mark was currently “in use in 
interstate commerce.”  Id. at 48, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.  The Torres Circuit 
iterated that when a trademark registrant files a verified renewal application stating 
that a mark is currently in use when “he knows or should know that he is not using 
the mark as registered . . . he has knowingly attempted to mislead the PTO.”  Id. at 
49, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
The Circuit asserted that the Board was ignoring the facts of the Torres case 
because it was clear that the Torres registrant knew he was deceiving the PTO.  
However, the Torres Court was not willing to concede that Torres fully appreciated 
that his conduct was deceitful, hence the constructive knowledge language.  The 
reality is that many companies, even larger companies like Bose, handle trademark 
prosecution and/or renewals in-house.  The person signing registration maintenance 
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constructive knowledge standard (simple negligence standard).  
Specifically, in the Board’s 2003 decision in Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, 
Inc.,28 the TTAB held that “[a] trademark applicant commits fraud in 
procuring a registration when it makes material representations of 
fact in its declaration which it knows or should know to be false or 
misleading.”29 
The Circuit opined that “the principle that the standard for finding 
intent to deceive is stricter than the standard for negligence or gross 
negligence” in patent inequitable conduct cases is applicable to 
trademark fraud cases.30  Accordingly, the court held that  
“a trademark is obtained fraudulently under the [Trademark] Act 
only if the applicant or registrant knowingly makes a false, material 
representation with the intent to deceive the [Trademark Office].”31  
The court further noted that “direct evidence of deceptive intent is 
rarely available,” and thus allowed for inferring intent to deceive 
from “indirect and circumstantial evidence.”32  However, the Circuit 
took pains to remind the Board (and the trademark bar) that this 
indirect and circumstantial evidence must still be “clear and 
convincing” evidence.33 
Applying this holding to the In re Bose facts, the Circuit34 agreed 
that Bose’s general counsel made false statements to the Trademark 
Office by stating that the WAVE mark was still in use for audio tape 
recorders and players despite his knowledge that Bose stopped 
making those products four or five years before he filed the renewal 
application.35  The Circuit, noting that Bose had not contested that 
                                                          
documents may be a non-lawyer, or like in In re Bose, a non-trademark lawyer who is 
unfamiliar with the particularities of practice before the Trademark Office.   
The Torres court and the TTAB seemed to signal a greater level of accountability for 
companies making sworn statements before the Office, one that seems to comport 
with the indefinite lifespan of trademark protection.  It may be that the Board went 
too far, but they had a little help from the Federal Circuit. 
 28. No. 92040535, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 227, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1205 (T.T.A.B. 
2003), abrogated by DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Am. Motors Corp., No. 92045099,  
2010 TTAB LEXIS 14 (T.T.A.B. 2010). 
 29. Id. at *13, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1209 (emphasis added). 
 30. In re Bose, 580 F.3d at 1244, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 31. Id. at 1245, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.  It is assumed that here the Circuit 
means that fraud is effected when a trademark applicant obtains registration, or a 
trademark owner maintains registration, by means of false, material representation(s) 
made with the intent to deceive the Trademark Office. 
 32. Id. at 1245, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 33. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 34. The original appellee Hexawave did not appear and the court granted the 
Office leave to stand in as the appellee in Circuit proceedings.  Id. at 1243,  
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 35. Id. at 1246, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
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the statement was material,36 concluded that Bose had, in fact, made a 
material misrepresentation to the Trademark Office.37 
The Circuit, however, pointed to the general counsel’s statement 
“under oath” that he believed that the repairing of old WAVE audio 
tape recorders and players and returning the repaired goods met the 
“use in commerce” standard for trademark renewal at the time he 
signed the renewal application.38  The Circuit proclaimed that 
“[u]nless the challenger [here the TTAB] can point to evidence to 
support an inference of deceptive intent, it has failed to satisfy the 
clear and convincing evidence standard required to establish a fraud 
claim.”39 
Characterizing the general counsel’s behavior as “occasioned by an 
honest misunderstanding or inadvertence,” the Circuit held that the 
Board had erred in finding that Bose had committed fraud in its 
renewal application and by subsequently cancelling the WAVE mark 
in its entirety.40  The Circuit then remanded the case so that the 
Board could restrict the registration’s covered goods41 to exclude 
audio tape recorders and players.42 
                                                          
 36. It is quite interesting that the Circuit would take pains to point out that it 
would not discuss materiality when Bose had not contested materiality.  It seems 
inarguable that stating the registered mark is in use for the goods as listed in the 
registration certificate is a material statement.  A statement that the mark is in use is 
the raison d’etre of the renewal application and the registration.  If the mark is not in 
use, the Registrant cannot maintain registration, absent the filing and acceptance of 
a declaration of excusable non-use.  Excusable non-use does, however, occur in 
limited circumstances.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1058(b)(2) (2006); Ex parte Kelley-How-
Thomson Co., 1958 WL 5895, 118 U.S.P.Q. 40 (Comm’r Patents June 24, 1958). 
 37. In re Bose, 580 F.3d at 1246, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 38. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 39. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 40. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 41. Id. at 1247, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (“We agree with the Board, 
however, that because the WAVE mark is no longer in use on audio tape recorders 
and players, the registration needs to be restricted to reflect commercial reality.”). 
 42. Perhaps those rendering the greatest sighs of relief in the post-Bose world are 
trademark practitioners with international clients who register their marks in the 
United States based on foreign registrations or pursuant to the Madrid Protocol.  
Foreign applicants often have registrations or Madrid applications for everything and 
the kitchen sink.  They are not required to submit any evidence that their marks are 
actually in use prior to registration, but they do have to aver that they have a bona 
fide intent to use the mark in commerce in the United States.  See 15 U.S.C.  
§§ 1126(e), 1141(5) (2006).  Particularly with Madrid requests for extension of 
protection, U.S. practitioners often handle these matters for foreign counsel, and 
thus might not even correspond with the foreign “client” directly.  As a result, 
trademark prosecution attorneys in the United States are often not in the best 
position to assess the veracity of a foreign client’s statements regarding whether 
goods or services are being produced or provided under a given mark at the time of 
registration or renewal. 
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B.  Primarily Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks 
In In re Spirits International, N.V.,43 the Circuit vacated the Board’s 
finding that the Applicant’s mark was primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive of the origin of the goods (vodka) and 
remanded the case back to the TTAB for reconsideration.44 
Spirits International N.V. filed a trademark application for 
MOSKOVSKAYA (of or from Moscow) in connection with vodka in 
1993.45  The assigned Trademark Examining Attorney first examined 
the mark under the doctrine of foreign equivalents.46  The doctrine 
of foreign equivalents states that foreign language marks generally 
must be translated into English to determine whether a mark  
(1) is primarily merely descriptive, (2) presents a likelihood of 
confusion with a registered mark, or (3) is primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive or geographically descriptive.47 
The Examining Attorney required a translation statement of the 
MOSKOVSKAYA mark into English included in the record and 
requested the applicant to indicate whether the applicant’s vodka 
would be manufactured, produced, or sold in Moscow, or would have 
any other connection to Moscow.48  The Applicant admitted “nyet” 
under sworn declaration, and, in 2006, the Trademark Office denied 
registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3), which prohibits the 
registration of marks that are primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive of the goods.49 
In order to make a prima facie showing that an applied-for mark is 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive, the Trademark 
Office must show that: 
(1) the mark’s primary significance is a generally known 
geographic location; (2) the relevant public would be likely to 
believe that the goods originate in the place named in the mark . . . 
                                                          
 43. 563 F.3d 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 44. Id. at 1349, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490. 
 45. Id. at 1349–50, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490. 
 46. Id. at 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490. 
 47. See id. at 1351–52, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491–92 (citing 2 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:34 (4th ed. 
2009) (“Under the ‘doctrine of foreign equivalents,’ foreign words from common 
languages are translated into English . . . .”); Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot 
Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1689, 
1696 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re N. Paper Mills, 64 F.2d 998, 998–99, 17 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
492, 493 (C.C.P.A. 1933). 
 48. In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490. 
 49. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.  The Applicant’s registration was 
suspended for twelve years, while the Trademark Office disposed of third-party 
applications that the Office felt might bar applicant’s mark from registering pursuant 
to section 2(d) of the Trademark Act as confusingly similar marks. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1490. 
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when in fact the goods do not come from that place; and (3) that 
the misrepresentation is a material factor in the consumer’s 
decision.50 
On appeal to the Board, Spirits proffered a mall-intercept survey 
and argued that the survey demonstrated that “the meaning of the 
mark is arbitrary because the term would not be translated into 
English by consumers, and that its geographic meaning would be lost 
on the public.”51 
The TTAB applied the doctrine of foreign equivalents and noted 
the translation of the MOSKOVSKAYA mark into English was “of or 
from Moscow,” satisfying the first prong of the primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive test.52  The Board accepted 
the evidence proffered by the Examining Attorney that Moscow is 
famous for vodka, satisfying the second prong of the test.53  Finally, 
the Board concluded that the Examining Attorney had met his 
burden as to the third prong by submitting evidence that Moscow was 
famous for high-quality vodka to the extent that the public would be 
materially influenced to purchase applicant’s vodka by virtue of the 
MOSKOVSKAYA mark.54 
The Board noted that the United States has approximately 706,000 
Russian speakers and concluded that at least one significant group of 
Americans would—upon viewing the MOSKOVSKAYA mark—
perceive a connection to Moscow and its storied vodka tradition and 
be influenced in their purchasing decision by virtue of the “Moscow” 
connotation.55  After faulting the Applicant’s mall-intercept survey for 
failing to include Russian speakers, the TTAB found that the 
Examining Attorney had met his burden under the primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive test and affirmed the 
refusal to register.56 
The Circuit roundly rejected the Board’s decision.  First, the court 
reminded the Board that the doctrine of foreign equivalents is not an 
absolute; that is, some marks would not be translated from the 
foreign language into English because they have established 
alternative meanings (e.g., “Cordon Bleu” for the famous culinary 
                                                          
 50. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490–91. 
 51. In re Spirits Int’l N.V., No. 74382759, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 6, at *9,  
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1078, 1081 (T.T.A.B. 2008). 
 52. In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
 53. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
 54. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
 55. Id. at 1351, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
 56. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
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school) or because the language is so rare.57  Of course, if consumers 
would not stop and translate “MOSKOVSKAYA,” then the primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive specter would never be 
raised.58 
Next, the Circuit essentially said that the Board did not understand 
the primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive test provision 
of the Trademark Act and set about correcting them.59  Section 
2(e)(3) was added to the Lanham Act by the North American Free 
Trade (NAFTA) Implementation Act in 1993.60  Prior to NAFTA, 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks were 
analyzed pursuant to Trademark Act section 2(e)(2), the provision 
that deals with geographically descriptive marks.61  Under section 
2(e)(2), there is no requirement that the Trademark Office evidence 
that a customer’s purchasing decision is materially affected by the 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark.62  Under the “new” 
section 2(e)(3) provision, geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
marks are treated like deceptive marks pursuant to Trademark Act 
section 2(a); accordingly, the Trademark Office must show that the 
deception effected by the mark is material—that consumers are more 
likely to purchase something because they believe it be from the 
geographic location referenced.63 
The Circuit, acknowledging that it had not spelled out the criteria 
for materiality in its post-NAFTA decisions, opined that materiality 
under section 2(e)(3) requires the Trademark Office to show first, 
that “a substantial portion of the relevant consumers” be deceived, 
and second, that because of this deception, those consumers would 
be influenced in their purchasing decision.64  The court found that 
                                                          
 57. Id. at 1352, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (citing Cont’l Nut Co. v. Cordon 
Bleu, 494 F.2d 1397, 1398, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 647, 648  (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Tia 
Maria, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524, 525–26 (T.T.A.B. 1975)). 
 58. In other words, if the average consumer would not stop and make the 
connection between “MOSKOVSKAYA” and “Moscow,” then the Applicant’s mark is 
not capable of deceiving the consumer by purporting a connection between 
Applicant’s vodka and Moscow. 
 59. In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1352–55, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492–94. 
 60. Id. at 1352, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
 61. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
 62. Id. at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
 63. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.  Of course, the Board asserted that it did 
apply this test, it just agreed with the Examining Attorney’s take on the matter, that 
is, that consumers would be more likely to purchase vodka coming from Moscow, 
Russia, than, say, Peoria, Illinois. 
 64. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493; see also id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493 
(noting that the governing case on primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks, In re California Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1853 (Fed. Cir. 2003), “did not address the question of whether the 
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the TTAB erred in not considering this proportionality in its 
determination that the deception would be material in the relevant 
consumers’ purchasing decisions.65  The court seemed to imply that 
the Board may have framed the class of relevant consumers too 
narrowly, and thus too hastily concluded that deception would 
occur.66  Accordingly, the Circuit remanded to the TTAB to consider 
whether a “substantial portion of the relevant consumers would be 
materially influenced in the decision to purchase the product or 
service by the geographic meaning of the mark.”67 
C.  Genericness 
The Federal Circuit addressed two cases regarding refusals of 
registration based on genericness in 2009.  In In re 1800Mattress.com,68 
the Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision upholding a generic refusal 
of the mark MATTRESS.COM on the Supplemental Register for 
“online retail store services in the field of mattresses, beds, and 
bedding.”69 
                                                          
materiality test of subsection (e)(3) embodies a requirement that a significant 
portion of the relevant consumers be deceived”). 
 65. Id. at 1357, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496. 
 66. See id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496 (“The problem with the Board’s 
decision is that it elsewhere rejected a requirement of proportionality, and discussed 
instead the fact that Russian is a ‘common, modern language[] of the world [that] 
will be spoken or understood by an appreciable number of U.S. consumers for the 
product or service at issue,’” but “failed to consider whether Russian speakers were a 
‘substantial portion of the intended audience’”). 
 67. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495–96. It is curious that the court did not take 
the Board to task for affirming a decision based on an inapposite test.   
The Applicant’s goods are vodka, a spirit.  Applicant’s application is based on intent-
to-use, and accordingly, his application should have been refused pursuant to section 
2(a)’s prohibition on the registration of a designation that includes “a geographical 
indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a 
place other than the origin of the goods.”  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006).   
The Examining Attorney should have refused registration not under the “deceptive” 
prong of section 2(a) or under the primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive prong of section 2(e)(3), but under the deceptive “geographical 
indication” portion of section 2(a).  See USPTO Trademark Examination Guide 1-06, 
Geographical Indications Used on Wines and Spirits (May 9, 2006), 
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/resources/exam/examguide1-06.jsp (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2010) (noting that if a section 2(a) “wines and spirits” refusal is issued, then 
section 2(a) deceptive and section 2(e)(3) refusals are not necessary). 
According to the Circuit, a rejection under either prong would distill to the same 
test.  In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493 (“The ‘addition 
of a materiality inquiry [to subsection (e)(3)] equates this test with the elevated 
standard applied under section 1052(a)’ . . . .  Since the NAFTA Act, the 
deceptiveness of the mark must be material under subsection (e)(3) just as it is 
under subsection (a).” (internal citations omitted)).  However, if the Circuit were 
going to remand, it is curious that they did not direct the office to analyze the case 
under the proper section of the Trademark Act. 
 68. 586 F.3d 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 69. Id. at 1361, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
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Dial-A-Mattress, 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC’s predecessor-in-
interest, began its attempt to register MATTRESS.COM in 
connection with “online retail store services in the field of mattresses, 
beds, and bedding” in 2005.70  More than two years later, the 
Trademark Office “finally” refused registration pursuant to section 
23(c) of the Trademark Act on the basis of genericness.71  Dial-A-
Mattress appealed to the TTAB who affirmed the Office’s findings, 
noting that “mattress” identified the very nature of Applicant’s 
business—selling mattresses—and that the juxtaposition of “mattress” 
and “.com” did not yield a registrable, non-generic whole.72 
Not surprisingly, the Board was not lulled by the Applicant’s 
argument that the “.com” in MATTRESS.COM called forth 
connotations of “comfort” or “comfortable” for the relevant 
purchasing public rather than a domain name extension.73 
On appeal, the Applicant further argued that MATTRESS.COM 
may be generic for “online mattress stores,” but that the record 
contained no evidence that MATTRESS.COM is generic for “online 
retail store services in the field of mattresses, beds, and bedding,”  
the identified services of record.74  Moreover, the Applicant argued 
that because brick and mortar mattress establishments also used 
“mattress.com” in their domain names, the applied-for mark was not 
generic.75 
As the Circuit noted, an applied-for mark is considered generic if 
relevant consumers use the mark to refer to the general kind or 
genus of goods or services with which the Applicant seeks 
protection.76  Thus, to assess genericness one must conduct a two-step 
inquiry:  (1) What is the general kind of goods or services at issue in 
the case at bar?; and (2) Is the applied-for mark understood by the 
general public to refer to the general kinds of goods or services at 
bar?77  Here, the court concluded that mattresses are the goods being 
sold by Applicant, and the mattress-consuming public would view 
                                                          
 70. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 71. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682. 
 72. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682–83. 
 73. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 74. Id. at 1362, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 75. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683–84. 
 76. Id. at 1362–63, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684 (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. 
Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989–90, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 528, 530 
(Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 77. Id. at 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
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MATTRESS.COM as “no more than the sum of its constituent 
parts.”78 
Accordingly, the Circuit found that 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC had 
submitted no evidence to support its theory that consumers view 
“.com” as shorthand for comfort or comfortable, such that the 
addition of “.com” to “mattress” effected a registrable, non-generic 
term.79  As such, the Circuit affirmed the Board’s refusal to register 
MATTRESS.COM .80 
In In re Hotels.com (Hotels.com III),81 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
Board’s decision finding HOTELS.COM to be generic for Applicant’s 
travel-related services. 
The Applicant, Hotels.com, L.P., a popular online booking agent, 
continued its crusade to register its HOTELS.COM mark,82 here in 
standard characters, in connection with “making reservations and 
bookings for temporary lodging for others.”83  The Trademark 
Examining Attorney denied Applicant’s attempt to register the mark 
registered pursuant to a claim of acquired distinctiveness under 
Lanham Act section 2(f).84  Moreover, the Examining Attorney issued 
a warning that the mark appeared to be generic for the services at 
issue, inter alia, booking hotels for others.85 
On appeal, the TTAB took the unusual step of finding that the 
mark was generic, but simultaneously finding that the evidence 
submitted in support of acquired distinctiveness, while flawed, was 
                                                          
 78. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.  The Applicant did not contest that 
“mattress” and “.com” were generic terms.  The Applicant’s ultimately unsuccessful 
argument was that the marriage of “mattress” and “.com” created a subjective 
compound phrase.  Cf. id. at 1362, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (“[A]ccording to 
the PTO . . . the separate terms ‘mattress’ and ‘.com’ in combination have a meaning 
identical to the common meaning of the separate components.”). 
 79. Id. at 1364, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685. 
 80. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685. 
 81. 573 F.3d 1300, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 82. As noted in the Board decision, the issues in the current standard character 
mark application were the subject of a prior Board decision regarding Hotels.com, 
L.P.’s previous application for a mark comprising “HOTELS.COM” and a bellboy 
design element.  In re Hotels.com, L.P. (Hotels.com II), No. 78277681, 2008 TTAB 
LEXIS 60, at *2–3, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1100, 1102 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2008) (citing 
In re Hotels.com, L.P. (Hotels.com I), No. 76414272 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 11, 2006) (not 
precedential), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/foia/ttab/ 
other/2006/76414272.pdf.  In the composite mark decision, the Board upheld the 
Trademark Office’s requirement that Hotels.com, L.P. disclaim the “generic” literal 
matter “HOTELS.COM.”  Hotels.com I, No. 76414272, at 32.  Hotels.com, L.P., did not 
appeal the Board’s first decision, and eventually complied with the disclaimer 
requirement allowing the applied-for mark to register on the Principal Register.  
Hotels.com II, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 60, at *2–4, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101–02. 
 83. Hotels.com III, 573 F.3d at 1301, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 84. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 85. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
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substantial enough to support the section 2(f) claim.86  The Board 
asserted that if the Applicant were to prevail on appeal to the Circuit 
on the issue of genericness, the evidence of acquired distinctiveness 
was sufficient.87 
The Applicant argued that hotel chains, not the Applicant, provide 
lodging and meals to the Applicant’s customers; there is, thus, an 
additional mental step at play, making the mark a non-generic term 
in connection with the stated services.88  Moreover, the Applicant 
asserted that the fusion of “HOTELS” with “.COM” creates a  
non-generic whole that, coupled with the survey evidence and sworn 
declarations introduced on appeal89 clearly indicates that the mark 
functions as a source indicator for Applicant’s services.90 
The TTAB relied on sundry definitions of the term of “HOTEL,” 
websites of third-party entities offering hotel services, printouts from 
Applicant’s website evidencing that Applicant helped its customers 
find “hotels,” and third-party usage of “hotel” domain names.91  The 
Board asserted that because “hotels” are the focus of Applicant 
services, and because “.com” is a generic suffix that signifies an online 
commercial presence, the aggregate expression “HOTELS.COM” has 
“the same [generic] meaning as the word ‘hotels’ by itself.”92 
The court agreed with the Board that “the generic term ‘hotels’ 
did not lose its generic character by placement in the domain name 
HOTELS.COM.”93  Additionally, the Circuit found that the Board 
                                                          
 86. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 87. This would seem impossible.  Most issues of genericness revolve around 
marks that teeter perilously on the brink between highly descriptive and purely 
generic.  The Board takes the position that HOTELS.COM is generic, and thus, not 
capable of functioning as a trade or service mark.  At the same time, they seem to be 
saying that if the Circuit thinks the mark falls on the highly descriptive side, the mark 
can be registered pursuant to section 2(f).  However, highly descriptive marks have a 
justifiably high hurdle to jump to establish acquired distinctiveness.  The Board 
sharply attacked the nature and quantity of the evidence presented by the Applicant 
in support of its section 2(f) claim.  How can they then say that the evidence is 
substantial enough to allow registration on the Principal Register? 
 88. See Hotels.com III, 573 F.3d at 1301, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533 (arguing 
that “the mark is not generic because the website HOTELS.COM does not provide 
lodging and meals for its users and is not synonymous with the word ‘hotel’”). 
 89. The Circuit did chastise the Board for its apparently “unwarranted”  
“total rejection” of Applicant’s rebuttal evidence, but found that the Board’s 
disregard of this evidence did not “negate the TTAB’s ultimate conclusion.”   
Id. at 1305, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536. 
 90. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537. 
 91. Id. at 1303, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535. 
 92. Id. at 1304, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535. 
 93. See id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535 (citing In re Reed Elsevier Prop., Inc., 
482 F.3d 1376, 1377, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that 
LAWYERS.COM is generic for an online database providing information for and 
about lawyers)). 
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reasonably gave controlling weight to the large number of similar 
usages of “hotel” domain names as well as common meaning and 
dictionary evidence that “hotels” and “.com” are generic terms, and 
that the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.94 
D.  Likelihood of Confusion 
Two of the Circuit’s 2009 trademark law decisions considered 
appeals involving refusals to register based on likelihood of 
confusion, and in both cases, the Circuit agreed with the Board.   
In In re Northland Organic Foods Corp.,95 the Circuit affirmed the 
Board’s decision upholding the Trademark Office’s partial refusal to 
register the Applicant’s mark in certain international classes of goods 
and services.96 
Applicant Northland Organic Foods Corp. sought registration of 
the mark SEED TO PLATE and the associated design for sundry 
goods and services.97  The Trademark Office refused registration as to 
International Classes 16, 42, and 44 pursuant to section 2(d) of the 
Trademark Act, finding a likelihood of confusion with Trademark 
Registration No. 3,047,968 for SEED TO PLATE A COMMUNITY 
PARTNERSHIP IN CARING.98 
To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists between an 
applied-for mark and a registered mark, the TTAB applied the 
criteria established in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.99  The TTAB 
affirmed the Office’s decision, finding that the marks were 
confusingly similar because “SEED TO PLATE” is the dominant 
                                                          
 94. Id. at 1305–06, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537. 
 95. 337 F. App’x 878 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 96. Id. at 879. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  The 
criteria include:  “(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as 
to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  (2) The similarity 
or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or 
registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use.  (3) The similarity or 
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels. (4) The conditions 
under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., “impulse” vs. careful, 
sophisticated purchasing. (5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length 
of use).  (6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.   
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.  (8) The length of time during 
and conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of 
actual confusion.  (9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house 
mark, ‘family mark,’ product mark).  (10) The market interface between applicant 
and the owner of a prior mark . . . .  (11) The extent to which applicant has a right to 
exclude others from use of its mark on its goods.  (12) The extent of potential 
confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial.   (13) Any other established fact 
probative of the effect of use.”  Id., 177 U.S.P.Q. at 567.  The TTAB is not required to 
analyze all of the DuPont factors in every case.  Id. at 1361–62. 
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literal matter in both the applied-for and registered marks, and that 
the parties’ goods and services were related based on third-party 
registrations of record, evidencing that “numerous entities” provided 
“books, magazines, educational services, and information services” 
under the same mark.100  Additionally, the TTAB found that 
Registrant’s identified services of “planting, growing, and harvesting 
crops” served the same class of purchasers via the same channels of 
trade as Northland’s consumers.101 
On appeal, Northland did not contest that the parties’ goods and 
services were related or that the trade channels and classes of 
customers overlapped.102  Instead, Northland argued that the  
marks were actually very different, and that the TTAB erred by:   
(1) ignoring the differing design elements present in the applied-for 
and registered marks; and (2) giving no weight to the additional 
wording present in the registered mark, A COMMUNITY 
PARTNERSHIP IN CARING.103 
The Circuit reiterated the long-standing principle that in 
considering the commercial impression of a mark—although all 
features of a mark must be considered—one feature may be more 
dominant than other features and thus may be accorded more 
weight.104  Typically, the literal portion of a mark is treated as more 
dominant than any design matter in a composite mark.105  Similarly, 
non-descriptive wording is treated as more significant than any 
descriptive or generic wording present in a compound mark.106  
According to the Circuit, it is “not necessary for the commercial 
impressions to be identical in order to sustain a finding of likelihood 
                                                          
 100. In re Northland, 337 F. App’x at 880. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 882.  Northland waxed poetically that the registered mark “creates the 
impression of a community who comes together to grow its own food as a result of 
the use of an image of a man and a woman tending a garden along with the words  
‘A Community Partnership in Caring,’” whereas the applied-for mark “creates the 
impression that the food hat is placed on one’s plate will be of the highest quality 
due to [Northland’s] fastidious supervision of the production cycle from its earliest 
stage when the food one [sic] the plate was merely a seed.”  Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 881 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 
1565, 1570, 218 U.S.P. Q. (BNA) 390, 395  (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 105. See In re Appetito Provisions Co., No. 423,405, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 47, at *1, 3 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553, 1553–54 (T.T.A.B. July 1, 1987) (remarking that consumers 
are more likely to remember the word element of the mark APPETITO than the 
related design elements). 
 106. See In re J.M. Originals Inc., No. 530,739, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 21, at *3–5,  
6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1393, 1394 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 20, 1987) (indicating that the 
likelihood of confusion analysis should not turn on common, descriptive wording, 
particularly when such wording has been disclaimed by the applicant). 
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of confusion.”107  Thus, “[i]n view of the identity of the words of the 
[dominant portion] of the marks,” the Board’s finding, uncontested 
by Northland, that the parties’ goods and services are related, and the 
determination that their trade channels and customers overlap,  
the court found that the Board did not err in partially refusing 
registration based on a likelihood of confusion with the registered 
mark.108 
In In re Inca Textiles,109 the Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision 
upholding the Trademark Office’s refusal to register Applicant’s 
mark INCA MAMA.110 
Inca Textiles, LLC sought registration of the mark INCA MAMA in 
connection with, inter alia, maternity clothing.111  The Trademark 
Office refused registration pursuant to Lanham Act section 2(d), 
asserting a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Registration  
No. 2735016 for INCA GIRL and the associated design for sundry 
articles of clothing.112  The Trademark Examining Attorney argued 
that the marks were similar because INCA is the dominant literal 
portion in both the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the 
goods are highly related because clothing manufacturers frequently 
produce both maternity and nonmaternity wear, and that maternity 
and nonmaternity wear are often sold in the same retail 
establishments.113 
On appeal to the Circuit, the Applicant argued that the Board 
improperly dissected the registered mark.114  Specifically, Inca 
Textiles argued that because the wording INCA GIRL appears in 
small lettering above the female design element’s head and on her 
shirt, the word portion of the mark is likely to be seen as the female 
character’s name and not a source-identifier.115  The Applicant 
further argued that the TTAB erred in ruling that the parties’ goods 
were closely related, noting that the Nice Agreement for classification 
of trademarks, to which the United States is a party, lists clothing and 
maternity clothing as separate categories.116  Finally, the Applicant 
argued that the trade channels were not similar because, in their 
                                                          
 107. In re Northland, 337 F. App’x at 882 (citing In re Research & Trading Corp., 
793 F.2d 1276, 1278, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. No. 2008-1443, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19656 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 2, 2009). 
 110. Id. at *1. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at *1–2. 
 113. Id. at *2. 
 114. Id. at *5. 
 115. Id. at *4. 
 116. Id. at *5–6. 
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(unsupported) estimation, consumers do not purchase maternity 
wear online.117 
The Circuit noted that doubts as to the likelihood of confusion 
between two marks should be resolved in favor of the prior user of 
the mark.118  The court further noted that “classification [of the goods 
or services in an application or cited registration] is wholly irrelevant 
to the issue of registrability.”119  The court found that the Board had 
properly “considered the cited mark in its entirety”120 and that it did 
not commit reversible error in opining that “maternity clothing is 
sufficiently similar to women’s clothing in general” as to engender 
source confusion when sold in the same retail environment.121  
Finally, avoiding addressing the Applicant’s bald assertion that 
pregnant women and their loved ones do not shop for maternity 
clothing online, the Circuit pointed to third-party registrations for 
brick and mortar stores selling both maternity and nonmaternity 
wear as evidence that Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods swim in the 
same trade channels.122 
E.  False Association 
In In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop,123 the Circuit affirmed the Board’s 
decision upholding the Trademark Office’s section 2(a) false 
association refusal of Applicant’s applications for marks comprising 
the word SHINNECOCK and design elements pursuant to section 
2(a).124  The Board agreed with the Trademark Examining Attorney 
that the Applicant’s marks falsely suggested a connection with the 
Shinnecock Nation.125 
                                                          
 117. Id. at *7. 
 118. Id. at *4 (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 
1265, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 119. Id. at *6 (citing Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, 9 F.3d 971, 975, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1771, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 120. Id. at *5.  The court also noted that the TTAB had “observed that in some of 
the appearances of INCA GIRL only the words were shown in association with 
women’s clothing.”  Id.  The Board also concluded that there is a likelihood of 
confusion as to the source of the goods bearing the marks INCA MAMA and INCA 
GIRL, with or without the design.  Id. at *7.   This conclusion seems overstated.   
After all, the INCA MAMA mark is registered with a rather elaborate design element.  
How can the TTAB rule on likelihood of confusion with a mark that is not before 
them?  The crux of its argument is really that the words dominate the design 
element, which is a long-standing general principle in trademark law.  In re Appetito 
Provisions Co., No. 423,405, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 47, at *3, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553, 
1554 (T.T.A.B. 1987). 
 121. In re Inca Textiles, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19656, at *6. 
 122. Id. at *7. 
 123. 571 F.3d 1171, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 124. Id. at 1172, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219. 
 125. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219. 
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Jonathan K. Smith, an on–reservation member of the Shinnecock 
Indian Nation and sole proprietor of the Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 
filed two trademark applications for SHINNECOCK and differing 
designs in connection with cigarettes.126  The Trademark Office 
refused registration on the grounds that Smith’s use of the 
Shinnecock name falsely suggested a connection between Smith’s 
cigarettes and Smith’s tribe, the Shinnecock Indian Nation of eastern 
Long Island, New York.127 
Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act bars, inter alia, the registration 
of a mark that consists of or comprises matter that may falsely suggest 
a connection with a person or entity, such as an Indian tribe, or 
institution.128  To succeed on a claim that a given trademark violates 
section 2(a)’s prohibition on false suggestion of connection, the 
Trademark Office (or an opposing party in an inter partes proceeding) 
must establish the following: 
(1) [T]hat the mark [at issue] is the same as, or a close 
approximation of, the name or identity previously used by another 
person or institution; (2) [that] the mark would be recognized as 
such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person or 
institution; (3) [that] the person or institution named by the mark 
is not connected with the activities performed by applicant under 
the mark; and (4) [that] the fame or reputation of the person or 
institution is such that, when the mark is used with the applicant’s 
                                                          
 126. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219. 
 127. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219. 
 128. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006); see In re White, No. 78175476, 2004 WL 2202268, 
at *1, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1715 (T.T.A.B. 2004) (refusing to register 
APACHE for use in connection with cigarettes because the name falsely suggested a 
connection with Apache tribes). Generally, the hot topic involving section 2(a) 
disparagement claims and Indian tribes centers around challenging trademark 
protections for sports teams’ marks that appropriate Native American names and 
imagery in a manner that many consider to be offensive or disparaging.  See Harjo v. 
Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 284  
F. Supp. 2d 96, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d, 415 F.3d 44, 75 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam), motion for summary judgment 
granted, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1891 (BNA) (D.D.C. 2008), affirmed in 
part, 565 F.3d 880, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1593 (BNA) (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
631 (2009).  Although the TTAB initially granted Harjo’s petition for cancellation of 
Pro-Football’s REDSKINS and REDSKINETTES trademark registrations on 
disparagement grounds under section 2(a), id. at 1749, the district court for the 
District of Columbia reversed the TTAB, holding that the doctrine of laches barred 
Harjo’s claims because she had waited eight years past the age of majority to file for 
cancellation.  Pro-Football v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 145.  The district court’s 
decision led to a series of appeals that address the laches issue, but the 
disparagement question did not reach the Federal Circuit. 
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goods or services, a connection with the person or institution 
would be presumed.129 
The Board asserted that the Shinnecock Indian Nation “has been a 
state–recognized tribe for over 200 years”;130 (2) that the wording 
SHINNECOCK has no other significance than as the name of the 
tribe; and that mere membership in a tribe or even the tribe’s 
awareness of Smith’s marketing of the cigarettes under the 
Shinnecock name was not enough to obviate a section 2(a) refusal.131  
To overcome a false association refusal, Smith needed to demonstrate 
that the Shinnecock Nation endorsed or sponsored the sale of his 
cigarettes, not merely that they were aware of it.132  Finally, the TTAB 
opined that the Shinnecock Indian Nation and its Shinnecock name 
are well-known and that “[because] Indian tribes, in general, are 
known to manufacture and market cigarettes,” consumers of Smith’s 
Shinnecock cigarettes were likely to “mistakenly presume the 
existence of a commercial connection between [Smith’s] cigarettes 
and the Shinnecock tribe.”133 
In support of his opposition to the section 2(a) refusal, Smith 
introduced a creative but ultimately ill-fated argument that, because 
the U.S. Trademark Register is replete with registrations for marks 
owned by non-Indians containing tribal names or the names of 
famous Indians,134 the Trademark Office’s refusal of his Shinnecock 
cigarette applications constituted racial discrimination in violation of 
Smith’s constitutional due process and equal protection rights under 
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.135  The TTAB quickly 
disposed of Smith’s discrimination claim, reasoning that the 
existence of registrations for marks containing Indian names was 
either because the goods or services in question were not those that 
consumers were likely to believe the tribe would provide, or because 
                                                          
 129. In re White, 2004 WL 2202268, at *6, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718; In re 
Sloppy Joe’s Int’l Inc., No. 74345270, 1997 WL 424966, at *3,  
43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350, 1353 (T.T.A.B. 1997). 
 130. In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, No. 78918061, 2008 WL 4354159, at *4 
(T.T.A.B.  Sept. 10, 2008). 
 131. Id. at *4–5. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at *7; see, e.g., U.S. Reg. No. 1447929 (using the mark SHINNECOCK 
HILLS GOLF CLUB for country club and restaurant services); U.S. Reg. No. 2739914 
(registering the mark 1891 SHINNECOCK for golf clothing and equipment);  
U.S. Reg. No. 2417630 (registering the mark TUSCARORA for cigars); U.S. Reg.  
No. 2396499 (using the mark CAYUGA for fishing reels); U.S. Reg. No. 2274143 
(using the mark GERONIMO for tobacco leaves); and U.S. Reg. No. 2968623 
(having the mark CRAZY HORSE for cigarettes). 
 135. In re Shinnecock, 2008 WL 4354159, at *5. 
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the Office had erred in allowing registration of the applied-for marks, 
and not because of racial bias.136 
On appeal to the Circuit, the Applicant did not contest that his 
marks falsely suggested a connection with the Shinnecock tribe,  
but instead contested whether the tribe was “an institution” pursuant 
to section 2(a) of the Trademark Act.137  He further repeated his 
arguments of racial discrimination and equal protection violations by 
the Trademark Office.138  The Circuit did not give weight to either of 
these arguments and found that the Board did not err in affirming 
the Examining Attorney’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 
denying registration.”139 
With respect to the Trademark Office’s allowance of other 
SHINNECOCK marks on the trademark register, the Circuit asserted 
that even if the applicant were correct and the marks were registered 
in contravention of section 2(a) of the Trademark Act, “[i]t does not 
follow that the proper remedy for such mischief is to grant 
Applicant’s marks.”140 
F.  Use in Commerce 
In Aycock Engineering Inc. v. Airflite Inc.,141 a majority of the Circuit 
panel affirmed the TTAB’s decision cancelling Aycock Engineering’s 
service mark registration for failure to use the mark in commerce.142 
William Aycock was a man with a dream:  chartering flights for 
passengers who wished to travel by air taxi.  He conceived of his 
middleman service in the late 1940s143 and christened it “Airflite.”144  
At that time, he believed he would need at least 300 participating air 
taxi operators to make his dream a reality.145  In the mid-1960s, he 
formed Aycock Engineering, Inc., and in 1970, he advertised his  
air-taxi-operator network to Federal Aviation Administration-certified 
air taxi pilots, some of whom entered into agreements with Aycock to 
                                                          
 136. Id. at *7 (“The fact that . . . some marks have been registered . . . in violation 
of the governing statutory standard does not mean that the [Patent and Trademark 
Office] must forgo applying the standard in all other cases.” (quoting In re Boulevard 
Entm’t Inc., 338 F.3d 1336, 1343, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 
2003))). 
 137. In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 1173, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1218, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 138. Id. at 1174, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220–21. 
 139. Id. at 1174–75, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221. 
 140. Id. at 1175, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221. 
 141. 560 F.3d 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 142. Id. at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. 
 143. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. 
 144. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. 
 145. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
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provide air taxi services.146  That same year, Aycock applied to register 
the AIRFLITE mark with the Trademark Office.  The mark matured 
into registration on the Supplemental Register in 1974.147 
Unfortunately, Aycock could not make his AIRFLITE service fly.  
Throughout the history of Aycock Engineering, he was never able to 
keep more than twelve contracted pilots at a time.  More importantly, 
he never advertised his AIRFLITE services to the general public and 
thus never arranged for air taxi transport for a single passenger.148  
Still, Mr. Aycock maintained his service mark, which he renewed in 
1994.149  In 2001, however, Airflite, Inc. grounded Aycock’s dream 
through a cancellation proceeding in which Airflite argued that 
Aycock had not truly used his AIRFLITE mark in commerce prior to 
registration.150  The Board agreed with Airflite, and cancelled  
Mr. Aycock’s AIRFLITE registration.151 
On appeal, the Circuit began by analyzing the services for which 
Aycock had registered the AIRFLITE mark to determine if the mark 
had been used in commerce pursuant to the statute.152  The Circuit, 
like the Board, held that Aycock’s services were “limited to 
regulating, coordinating, operating, or administering a system to 
book flights on airplanes.”153 
Under section 45 of the Trademark Act, service marks satisfy the 
“use in commerce” requirement when:  (1) a mark is “used or 
displayed in the sale or advertising of services” and (2) either (i) “the 
services are “rendered in commerce” or (ii) “the services are 
rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a 
foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in 
commerce in connection with the services.”154  When a registered 
mark does not satisfy this use requirement, it is void ab initio.155 
                                                          
 146. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 147. Id. at 1354, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 148. Aycock had also registered two toll-free numbers for use by the public, but 
there was no evidence that these numbers were ever used or that Aycock ever spoke 
to a potential passenger about making a reservation.  Id. at 1361, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1308–09. 
 149. Id. at 1354, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 150. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 151. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 152. See id. at 1355, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (“A prerequisite to deciding the 
use requirement issue . . . involves defining the recitation of services in the 
application.”). 
 153. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 155. Aycock, 560 F.3d at 1357, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305 (citing Gay Toys, Inc. 
v. McDonald’s Corp., 585 F.2d 1067, 1068, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 722, 723 (C.C.P.A. 
1978)). 
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Aycock argued that setting up the network was sufficient to comply 
with the use in commerce requirement.156  The Circuit deemed 
Aycock’s efforts to put the AIRFLITE dream in flight mere 
“preparatory stages” of a service’s development157 and stated that, 
absent a showing that the services were actually offered to the public, 
the use in commerce requirement could not be met.158  Accordingly, 
the court affirmed the Board’s cancellation of Aycock’s mark.159 
Judge Newman passionately defended Aycock’s predicament.160  
She argued that the Trademark Office had crafted Aycock’s 
recitation of services based on Aycock’s description of his services 
during prosecution, the specimens of use submitted with his 
application, and the recitation of services as mandated by the 
Examining Attorney.161 Noting that Aycock acquiesced in the final 
recitation of services after many exchanges with the Trademark 
Office, Judge Newman concluded that “[i]f indeed a flaw in the 
registration is now discovered, after thirty-five years,162 it should be 
clarified and corrected, not voided ab initio.”163  Judge Newman 
determined that the issue of whether the recruitment of air taxi 
operators constitutes a “registrable service” was improperly 
considered by the Board because it was not raised in the cancellation 
proceeding and was not briefed by either party.164  Finally, Judge 
Newman asserted that “the service of recruiting air taxi operators and 
                                                          
 156. Id. at 1355, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 157. See id. at 1361, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309 (“That Mr. Aycock advertised to, 
contracted with, and was paid by air taxi operators does not transform the service 
from its preparatory stages to being rendered in commerce.  Instead, these actions 
were Mr. Aycock’s attempts to build the service’s infrastructure, which, when 
completed, could then be offered to the public (and thus ‘rendered in 
commerce’).”). 
 158. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. 
 159. Id. at 1362, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309.  The court, however, did not 
address Airflite, Inc.’s abandonment and fraud claims.  See id. at 1354 n.5,  
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303 n.5 (stating that the TTAB declined to rule on the 
issues of abandonment and fraud claims since it cancelled the AIRFLITE mark). 
 160. See id. at 1362, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310 (Newman, J., dissenting)  
(“The cancellation of this long-standing registration is seriously flawed, and is 
seriously unjust.”). 
 161. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. 
 162. The majority opinion also expressed some regret for Aycock and his lost 
dream.  See id. at 1362 n.12, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309 n.12 (majority opinion) 
(“We find it unfortunate that Mr. Aycock lost his AIRFLITE service mark after the 
USPTO granted him a registration over thirty years ago.  But under the federal 
trademark and service mark registration system, no period of years exists beyond 
which a mark holder becomes immune from invalidation under the use 
requirement.”).  The Aycock majority suggested that Aycock might find some shelter 
from this “harsh reality” under common law trademark doctrine.  Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1309 n.12. 
 163. Id. at 1362, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 1363, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
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contracting with them is indeed a registrable service[,]” and 
therefore “Aycock was not engaging in advance publicity, but was 
performing the registered service.”165 
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A. Admissibility of Evidence and Standing in TTAB Proceedings 
The Circuit dealt with two cases regarding the introduction and 
admissibility of evidence and standing, reversing the Board in both 
instances.  In Cold War Museum Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum Inc.,166 the 
Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s decision in a cancellation battle 
between two dueling museums specializing in Cold War artifacts.  
Francis Gary Powers, Jr. sought and received registration of the mark 
THE COLD WAR MUSEUM in connection with museum services, 
pursuant to section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, by submitting evidence 
that his descriptive mark had acquired distinctiveness.167 
In the course of prosecuting the application, Mr. Powers submitted 
a record of over 200 pages of material to support his claim that his 
mark had become distinctive through substantially exclusive and 
continuous use in commerce for, at least, the previous five years.168  
Three years after Mr. Powers’s mark was registered, Cold War Air 
Museum Inc. moved to cancel Mr. Powers’s mark, arguing that the 
mark was merely descriptive or generic for museum services, and 
therefore, registration was permitted in error.169  Mr. Powers argued 
that the Trademark Office had evaluated the evidence of acquired 
distinctiveness proffered during prosecution and that the mark had 
been approved for registration with a section 2(f) claim.170  
Accordingly, he asserted that the registered mark should be 
                                                          
 165. Id. at 1363–64, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310–11.  Judge Newman seems to 
argue that the Office should have read the services more liberally or allowed Aycock 
to amend the recitation in order to keep the registration from being cancelled. 
 166. 586 F.3d 1352, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 167. Id. at 1354, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.  Section 2 of the Lanham Act states 
that nothing prevents an applicant from registering a distinctive mark of the 
applicant’s goods in commerce.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006).  37 C.F.R. § 2.41(b) lists 
three types of evidence that an applicant may use to establish the requirements of 
distinctiveness as defined in the governing statute:  (1) A claim of ownership of one 
or more prior registrations on the Principal Register of the same mark for goods or 
services that are the same as or related to those named in the pending application; 
(2) A statement verified by the applicant that the mark has become distinctive of the 
applicant’s goods or services by reason of substantially exclusive and continuous use 
in commerce by the applicant for the five years before the date when the claim of 
distinctiveness is made; (3) Actual evidence of acquired distinctiveness. 
 168. Cold War, 586 F.3d at 1355, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627. 
 169. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627. 
 170. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627. 
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presumed  valid.171  Although the Board acknowledged that the issue 
of acquired distinctiveness had been raised and resolved in the 
Registrant’s favor during the application process, the Board faulted 
Mr. Powers for not resubmitting the evidence proffered during 
prosecution during the cancellation proceedings.172  The Board used 
this failure to resubmit evidence as a basis to exclude the evidence of 
acquired distinctiveness altogether.173  Having excluded the only 
evidence Mr. Powers had provided, the Board asserted that  
Mr. Powers had not met his burden, found in favor of the petitioner 
museum, and cancelled “The Cold War Museum” mark.174 
The Circuit was decidedly chilly to the Board’s Cold War decision.  
First, the court attacked the Board’s decision to ignore the ample 
evidence of acquired distinctiveness in the application file.   
They pointed to the “clear” and “unambiguous” nature of governing 
statute 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b) regarding the treatment of application 
files:175 
The file . . . of each registration against which a petition . . . for 
cancellation is filed forms part of the record and the proceeding 
without any action by the parties and reference may be made to the 
file for any relevant and competent purpose.176 
Accordingly, the Circuit stated, the Board had no excuse for 
excluding the evidence, as the statute makes clear that Mr. Powers 
did not have to submit any additional evidence to ensure that the 
Board would consider his submissions in support of his acquired 
distinctiveness claim.177 
Next, the court examined the Board’s treatment of the 
distinctiveness issue.  According to the Circuit, the Cold War Air 
Museum was so focused on the descriptiveness of the Registrant’s mark 
that they did not adequately address Mr. Powers’s claim of acquired 
                                                          
 171. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627. 
 172. Id. at 1355–56, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627–28. 
 173. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627–28. 
 174. Id. at 1356, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627–28. 
 175. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628. 
 176. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628. 
 177. Id. at 1357, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628–29.  The Board attempted to draw a 
distinction between the application file, without defining what they considered an 
“application file” to be comprised of, and filings made subsequent to the initial 
application but during the course of prosecution of the applied-for mark.  In support 
of this distinction, the Board cited its decision in an opposition proceeding,  
British Seagull Ltd. v. Brunswick Corp., No. 80,900, 1993 WL 409141, at *1, 28 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 6, 1993), which the Board claimed had been 
“affirmed” by the Federal Circuit in Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 
1527, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  The Circuit denied ever affirming 
any Board finding on evidentiary issues or distinctiveness in British Seagull.  Cold War, 
586 F.3d at 1357 n.4, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 n.4. 
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distinctiveness.178  However, Mr. Powers, by submitting a claim of 
acquired distinctiveness, had already acknowledged that his mark is 
descriptive.179  The court faulted the Board for failing to identify the 
Air Museum’s conflation of the descriptiveness and distinctiveness 
issues.180 
Finally, the court rebuked the Board on the “less than precise” 
discussion of the shifting burdens contained within a cancellation 
proceeding, noting that the movant in a cancellation proceeding 
must first evidence a prima facie case that the registration is invalid, 
in the instant case, that the applied-for mark had not acquired 
distinctiveness.181  If a prima facie case is shown, then, and only then, 
does the Registrant have a burden to produce additional evidentiary 
support to defend the registration.182  Similarly, in rendering its 
ultimate decision in a cancellation proceeding, the Board must 
determine whether the petitioner has satisfied the burden of 
persuasion that the mark was registered in error based on all the 
evidence of record, both from the application file and information 
made of record during the course of the cancellation action.183   
Here, the court determined that the Board erred in its analysis in 
several ways:  first, in incorrectly finding a prima facie case where the 
Air Museum did not address acquired distinctiveness; second, in 
superimposing on the Registrant a duty not found in the statute to  
re-proffer evidence of acquired distinctiveness; and finally, in 
concluding that the Air Museum had met its burden of persuasion.184  
The court reversed the Board’s decision, finding that the Board erred 
                                                          
 178. Id. at 1358, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (“Air Museum failed to present any 
evidence whatsoever relating to the distinctiveness of the mark.”). 
 179. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (“Where an applicant seeks registration 
on the basis of a Section 2(f) claim, the mark’s descriptiveness is a nonissue;  
an applicant’s reliance on Section 2(f) during prosecution presumes that the mark is 
descriptive.”) 
 180. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (“Air Museum failed even to argue that the 
mark had not acquired distinctiveness.  Instead Air Museum’s arguments and 
evidence related exclusively to the mark’s descriptiveness, which . . . is irrelevant to 
the validity of a Section 2(f) registration.  Because Air Museum failed to even argue 
the issue of acquired distinctiveness in its petition for cancellation, it failed to rebut 
the registration’s presumption of validity.  Therefore, the Board erred as a matter of 
law in concluding that Air Museum had established a prima facie case that the mark 
had not acquired distinctiveness.”)  Id. 
 181.  See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1629 (“Given Air Museum’s failure to rebut the 
registration’s presumption of validity, the Board also erred as a matter of law in 
shifting the ‘burden’ to the Cold War Museum.”). 
 182. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (“In a cancellation proceeding, unlike 
an opposition, the registration has a presumption of validity.” (citing 15 U.S.C.  
§ 1057(b) (2006))). 
 183. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
 184. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629–30. 
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as a matter of law in concluding that the Air Museum established a 
prima facie case that the registered mark had not acquired 
distinctiveness.185 
In the next case, Bishop v. Flournoy,186 Applicant Flournoy  
sought registration of the marks “100% ART” and 
ONEHUNDREDPERCENT ART in connection with International 
Class 16 goods, including, inter alia, paintings and printed 
informational cards in the field of art.187  Bishop, an artist, opposed 
both applications, arguing that he had standing to oppose Flournoy’s 
applications, that he had priority of use over Flournoy, and that 
Flournoy had committed fraud on the Trademark Office in 
prosecuting her applications.188  He attached evidence to his notices 
of opposition.189 
Flournoy argued that Bishop had not established any right to relief, 
though she acknowledged that she had known that Bishop was using 
both marks in connection with his artwork.190  Bishop, representing 
himself, did not properly introduce evidence during the period for 
taking testimony.  Instead, Bishop attached evidence to his trial 
briefs.191  Flournoy did not submit a response.192  Bishop then filed 
reply briefs arguing that the Board should grant judgment in his 
favor because Flournoy had not briefed the TTAB.193  The Board 
refused to consider either the evidence attached to his notices of 
opposition194 or his trial briefs because the evidence was not 
submitted at the proper phase of the opposition proceeding.195   
In addition, the Board found that Bishop had not proven his 
standing or pleaded any ground for relief.196 
Bishop appealed to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1295(a)(4)(B).197  The Circuit reviewed the standing and legal 
determinations de novo.198  The court noted that in a cancellation 
                                                          
 185. Id. at 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
 186. 319 F. App’x. 897 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 187. Id. at 898. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 898. 
 193. Id. 
 194. The TTAB consolidated the two opposition proceedings.  Id. 
 195. Id. at 899. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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petition,199 a movant need only evidence a reasonable belief that he 
will be damaged by the registration of the mark.200  According to the 
Circuit, this “is not a rigorous requirement.”201  The Circuit found 
that Flournoy’s admission that she knew Bishop was using the 
applied-for marks in connection with his artwork constituted 
statements against interest.202  While acknowledging that Bishop’s 
evidence was properly excluded by the Board, the Circuit asserted 
that Flournoy’s admissions against interest may have established 
“standing and fraud or likelihood of confusion.”203  Accordingly, the 
Circuit remanded to the TTAB to determine whether Flournoy’s 
admissions satisfied Bishop’s burden of proof.204 
B.  Res Judicata 
The Circuit decided two trademark appeals involving res judicata.  
In American Rice, Inc. v. Dunmore Properties S.A,.205 the Circuit agreed 
with the Board that American Rice’s cancellations claims were 
precluded under res judicata.  In 1982, American Rice, Inc. (“ARI”), 
one of the largest rice millers in the United States, registered the 
mark “ABU BINT” in the United States for use in connection with 
rice.206  ABU BINT translates from Arabic into English as “Father of a 
Girl.”207  In 2002, Dunmore registered “BINT ALARAB,” or “Arab’s 
girl,” in connection with rice.208  In 2003, ARI moved for cancellation 
of the BINT ALARAB mark based on trademark infringement, as well 
as trademark dilution, of its ABU BINT mark.209  Before the discovery 
period in the 2003 cancellation proceedings ended, ARI withdrew its 
petition for cancellation.210  Because ARI had withdrawn its petition 
without Dunmore’s consent, the TTAB dismissed ARI’s petition with 
prejudice in 2004.211 
                                                          
 199. Of course, this was an opposition proceeding, not a cancellation proceeding.  
Presumably, the standard should be the same for an opposition proceeding given 
that registered marks have the presumption of validity.  Id. 
 200. Id. at 900 (citing Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1095, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1023, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. (“[S]tatements in pleadings may have evidentiary value as admissions 
against interest by the party that made them.” (quoting T.B.M.P. § 704.06(a))). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25467 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2009) (per curiam). 
 206. Id. at *1. 
 207. Id. at *2 n.1. 
 208. Id. at *1. 
 209. Id. at *2. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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In 2007, ARI filed a new petition for cancellation of the BINT 
ALARAB mark, again alleging trade confusion and trademark 
dilution.212  Dunmore subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing 
that ARI’s petition was barred by res judicata.213  On appeal to the 
TTAB, the Board treated Dunmore’s motion as a motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that Dunmore’s motion relied on 
matters outside the 2007 pleadings, such as the Board’s 2004 
dismissal order.214 
Possibly attempting to avoid the res judicata claim, ARI amended 
its cancellation petition to include a claim that Dunmore had 
committed fraud on the Trademark Office during prosecution of its 
BINT ALARAB application and requested time to conduct discovery 
on its claims.215  The Board denied ARI’s motion for time to conduct 
discovery and granted Dunmore’s motion for summary judgment in 
2009.216  ARI subsequently appealed to the Federal Circuit.217 
The court reviewed de novo the Board’s finding of res judicata and 
its ruling on Dunmore’s summary judgment; the court also reviewed 
for abuse of discretion the Board’s denial of ARI’s motion for time to 
conduct discovery.218 
Res judicata refers to related legal concepts:  claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion.219  Claim preclusion provides that a party cannot 
newly litigate a matter if a court determined that the matter should 
have been raised in earlier litigation, but was not.220  Issue preclusion 
bars a party from litigating a matter if the matter has been litigated 
and decided previously.221  In the case at bar, ARI’s petition for 
cancellation was never actually litigated and decided; thus, claim 
preclusion is the basis for Dunmore’s res judicata defense.222 
The test for claim preclusion, as articulated by the Circuit, 
precludes a claim when:  (1) the parties are identical; (2) “there was 
                                                          
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at *2–3. 
 215. Id. at *3. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at *4 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, CH. 3, INTRODUCTORY 
NOTE (1982)). 
 220. Id. (citing Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129–30 (1983) (noting that 
claim preclusion also bars the bringing of “any other admissible matter” which might 
have been brought in the original action). 
 221. See id. (citing 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d ed. 2002) (describing issue 
preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, as “the effect of foreclosing relitigation 
of matters that have once been litigated and decided”)). 
 222.  Id. at *4–5. 
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earlier final judgment on the merits of the claim”; and (3) the new 
claim is based on the same set of transactional facts as the first.223 
Neither ARI nor Dunmore contested that the parties were the same 
as in the 2004 cancellation action or that the Board had dismissed 
ARI’s petition with prejudice.224  The only issue the Circuit had to 
decide on appeal was whether the 2007 petition for cancellation on 
grounds of trade confusion, trademark dilution, and fraud was based 
on the same set of transactional facts as ARI’s 2003 petition.225   
ARI argued that its new petition for cancellation necessarily would be 
based on material facts that occurred post-2003, but that it needed 
additional discovery to fully uncover these new material facts.226  ARI 
further argued that it is Dunmore’s burden, not ARI’s, to prove that 
no new facts had occurred since the dismissal of the 2003 petition.227 
The Circuit noted that ARI’s 2007 petition was almost identical to 
its 2003 petition.  Accordingly, the court found that there was 
nothing to suggest that the 2007 petition was based on facts outside 
the transactional facts contained in the 2003 petition.228  The court 
was unfazed by the fraud claim, which was new to the 2007 petition, 
noting that ARI was alleging that Dunmore had committed fraud in 
2000 and 2001 during the BINT ALARAB application process.229   
The Circuit held that the fraud allegations were also claim-precluded 
because the alleged fraud could have been raised in the 2003 
cancellation petition.230 
Finally, regarding the motion for time for additional discovery, the 
Circuit held that ARI’s motion for discovery was misplaced.  ARI was 
not seeking discovery to obtain facts to refute the res judicata claim 
but rather to bolster its 2007 petition.231  Accordingly, the Circuit 
ruled that the Board did not err in either denying the motion for 
time to conduct discovery or finding that the 2007 petition was 
barred by res judicata.232 
                                                          
 223.  Id. at *5 (Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1362,  
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1854, 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at *5–6. 
 226. Id. at *6.  
 227. Id.  
 228. See id. (“ARI’s 2007 Petition is, with the exception of a single minor, 
nonmaterial word change, identical to its 2003 Petition . . . [and] paragraphs 1–10 
and 18–23 of ARI’s amended 2007 Amended Petition are identical to the paragraphs 
of the 2007 Petition and, with again a single nonmaterial exception, likewise 
identical to those of the 2003 Petition.”). 
 229. Id. at *7. 
 230. Id. at *7–8. 
 231. Id. at *8–10. 
 232. Id. at *10. 
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In Holt’s Co. v. Virgin Enterprises Ltd.,233 the Circuit affirmed the 
TTAB’s holding without opinion.  Holt’s Co. had applied to register 
the mark ASHTON VIRGIN SUN GROWN—in standard characters—
in connection with cigars.234  Virgin Enterprises opposed registration 
on grounds of likelihood of confusion and trademark dilution with 
Virgin Enterprises’ thirty-eight previously registered VIRGIN marks 
for sundry goods and services.235  Although Holt’s Co. denied Virgin 
Enterprises’ allegations, Virgin moved for summary judgment by 
arguing that—due to the Board’s prior decision in a related case—
claim preclusion and res judicata barred Holt’s Co.’s ASHTON 
VIRGIN SUN GROWN mark from registration based on.236 
Specifically, Holt’s Co. had previously sought registration for 
ASHTON CABINET VSG VIRGIN SUN GROWN and the associated 
design.237  Virgin opposed registration, and Holt’s Co. did not file an 
answer.238  The Board entered a default judgment in Virgin’s favor.239 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Virgin argued that 
Holt’s Co.’s application for ASHTON VIRGIN SUN GROWN was 
based on the same transactional facts as its previous ASHTON 
CABINET VSG VIRGIN SUN GROWN and associated design 
application because the parties to the previous opposition were the 
same, the goods were the same, and the marks were legally 
identical.240  Holt’s Co. countered that because the current applied-
for mark and their dismissed applied-for mark are not identical—the 
wording is different and the dismissed application was for a design 
mark—unique separate transactional or operative facts exist in the 
current application241 such that res judicata could not apply.242   
The Board’s analysis revolved around the commonalities between 
Holt’s Co. applied-for mark and the drawing in the dismissed 
application.243  Specifically, the Board cited Institut National Des 
                                                          
 233. 309 F. App’x 412, 2009 WL 279054, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2009) (per 
curiam). 
 234. Virgin Enter. Ltd. v. Holt’s Co., No. 91176609, 2008 WL 885888, at *1. 
(T.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2009). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at *1, *3.  Given that the TTAB issued a default judgment, no claims were 
litigated or decided in the prior Board decision. 
 237. Id. at *1. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at *2. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id.  Holt’s Co. also argued that res judicata should not preclude their claim 
because their previous “out-sourced” counsel made them do it.  The Board did not 
address this claim.  Id. 
 243. Id. at *3. 
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Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp.244 for the proposition that 
the Board must determine whether the commercial impression of a 
mark is the same as the mark involved in the current proceeding to 
determine whether or not the res judicata claim preclusion doctrine 
is triggered.245 
In Holt’s Co., the Board asserted that Holt’s Co.’s ASHTON VIRGIN 
SUN GROWN mark had evolved from the ASHTON CABINET VSG 
VIRGIN SUN GROWN and associated design mark and that the 
deletion of the design element and the literal matter CABINET VSG 
were minor alterations that did not sufficiently change the 
commercial impression of Holt’s Co.’s mark to allow registration.246  
Accordingly, the Board granted Virgin’s summary judgment motion 
and denied registration of the ASHTON VIRGIN SUN GROWN 
mark.247 
C. Contract Estoppel in Opposition Proceedings 
In Cipriani Group, Inc. v. Orient-Express Hotels Inc.,248 the Circuit 
upheld the Board’s decision without opinion.249  Cipriani Group filed 
applications for CIPRIANI in connection with real estate and food-
related services.250  Orient-Express Hotels Inc. and Hotel Cipriani 
S.r.l. separately opposed registration, arguing that Cipriani Group’s 
application was barred by a previously executed settlement 
agreement and the likelihood of confusion with previously registered 
(Orient-Express) and common-law (Hotel Cipriani) trademarks.251  
Cipriani Group countered that the settlement agreement did not 
preclude registration of its CIPRIANI mark and asserted unclean 
hands as an affirmative defense.252  The Board consolidated the 
separate opposition proceedings, and the opposers subsequently 
moved for summary judgment.253  The Board looked to the plain 
language of the settlement agreement, which provided that 
“[applicant] may conduct any business it chooses to engage in, 
provided that it is designated . . . as CIPRIANI with the identity of the 
                                                          
 244. No. 97417, 1998 WL 650076, at *1, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875, 1894 (T.T.A.B. 
1998). 
 245. Holt’s Co., 2008 WL 885888, at *3. 
 246. Id.  
 247. Id. at *4. 
 248. 331 F. App’x 749 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Orient-Express Hotels Inc. v. Cipriani Group, No. 91176217, 2008 WL 
2385984, at *1 (T.T.A.B. May 27, 2008), aff’d, 331 F. App’x 749 (Fed. Cir. 2009)  
(per curiam). 
 251. Id. at *1. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
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product or service offered or any other descriptive terms or name 
except use of the word HOTEL in connection therewith.”254   
The Board found that this language barred registration of Cipriani 
Group’s CIPRIANI mark because the settlement agreement forbade 
Cipriani Group’s use of the mark CIPRIANI without additional literal 
matter.255 
The Board briefly addressed Cipriani Group’s unclean hands 
defense, which centered around Orient-Express Hotels Inc. and 
Hotel Cipriani S.r.l.’s use and registration of CIPRIANI marks outside 
the United States and their actions to prevent Cipriani Group from 
using marks containing CIPRIANI with or without additional literal 
matter outside the United States.256  Because the settlement 
agreement was silent as to use or registration by either Cipriani 
Group or Orient-Express Hotels Inc. and Hotel Cipriani S.r.l. outside 
the United States, the Board found that Cipriani Group had not 
proved its affirmative defense of unclean hands.257 
D.  Failure to Prosecute  
In Mc.Zeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,258 McZeal, doing business as 
International Walkie Talkie, brought suit against Sprint Nextel and 
Nextel Communications in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas, alleging, among other claims, patent and trademark 
infringement.259  Specifically, International Walkie Talkie alleged that 
Sprint and Nextel had infringed his service mark registration  
for “INTERNATIONAL WALKIE TALKIE,” U.S. Registration  
No. 3,016,449.260  McZeal represented himself as International Walkie 
Talkie in the Texas court proceedings.261  During the first stage of the 
infringement proceedings, the Southern District of Texas dismissed 
International Walkie Talkie’s case for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted and for want of prosecution.262   
The Federal Circuit initially found that International Walkie Talkie 
                                                          
 254. Id. at *2. 
 255. Cipriani, 2008 WL 2385984, at *4. 
 256. See id. (“On its face, the [settlement] agreement does not address actions 
taken by opposers outside the United States”). 
 257. Id. at *4–5.  Having disposed of the contract estoppel claim and the unclean 
hands defense, the Board did not address the opposers’ claims of likelihood of 
confusion and the adequacy of Cipriani Group’s specimens of record, though it 
noted that alleged error on the part of the Trademark Office—i.e., accepting 
insufficient specimens—is not proper grounds for an opposition. Id. at *5. 
 258. 335 F. App’x 966, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (McZeal II). 
 259. Id. at 966–67. 
 260. Id. at 967. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
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had stated enough of a claim to survive Sprint’s summary judgment 
motion, and vacated and remanded the case back to the district court 
to allow International Walkie Talkie the opportunity for discovery on 
the nature of Sprint’s allegedly infringing electronics device.263 
The district judge voiced her disdain for the Circuit’s decision to 
vacate her order and remand the case.  In oral argument, the district 
judge asserted that she was “actually comfortable simply holding the 
same way [she] held last time,” called the Circuit’s decision to 
remand and vacate “absurd,” and deemed that the Circuit’s order 
“[did] not run to the rational faculties.”264 
In order to speed up the proceedings, the district court ordered 
International Walkie Talkie to provide a list of all websites used by 
International Walkie Talkie from 2005–2008 and a precise 
description of “how, when, and where” it had used its International 
Walkie Talkie mark.265  Sprint was required to provide the “extent and 
timings of all uses by Sprint Nextel” of the International Walkie 
Talkie mark.266 
McZeal, still pro se on behalf of International Walkie Talkie, did not 
comply with the district court’s order and showed up late to his next 
scheduled hearing in March 2009.267  At the hearing, the district court 
chastised International Walkie Talkie (and the Federal Circuit), 
saying “[b]ecause I was obliged by a gross error in the Court of 
Appeals to readdress this case, I did.  I asked you [International 
Walkie Talkie] to do a few fairly straightforward, simple things that 
would have helped Sprint understand what you thought you were 
doing.”268  Finding that International Walkie Talkie had “produced 
nothing,” “failed to respond to inquiries by defense counsel,” and 
“did not appear at the hearing,” the district court issued a dismissal 
order based on both International Walkie Talkie’s purported failure 
to state a claim and want of prosecution, i.e., not complying with the 
Court’s production order.269 
Unsurprisingly, the Federal Circuit did not take kindly to the 
district court’s unfettered criticism.  The Circuit found that Texas 
judge had improperly dismissed International Walkie Talkie’s case 
based on a failure to state a claim, “disregarding [the Federal 
                                                          
 263. Id.; McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1358–59, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1315, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (McZeal I). 
 264. McZeal II, 335 F. App’x at 967.  
 265. Id. at 968. 
 266. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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Circuit’s] prior mandate.”270  However, the Circuit found that Texas’s 
dismissal of International Walkie Talkie’s claim for want of 
prosecution did not constitute an abuse of discretion given 
International Walkie Talkie’s “contumacious conduct”271 comprising 
violations of multiple orders and its failure to timely attend the 
March 2009 hearing.272 
The Circuit ultimately affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of 
International Walkie Talkie’s case for want of prosecution.273 
E.  Common Law Rights 
In Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding Inc.,274 the Federal Circuit upheld 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio’s finding of 
no trademark infringement.275 
This case stems from alleged patent and trademark infringement 
of one of the legendary home appliance manufacturer’s blender 
models, the VITA-MIX 5000.276  Basic Holding markets several 
competitor blenders, including the BLENDER SOLUTIONS 5000.277  
Vita-Mix registered VITA-MIX in connection with “electric food 
processors and electric food blenders for domestic and commercial 
use.”278  It had never attempted to register the VITA-MIX mark with 
the numeric matter “5000.”279  On appeal, Vita-Max argued that its 
common law rights in the “5000” numeric matter had been infringed 
by Basic’s BLENDER SOLUTIONS 5000.280 
In order to analyze whether Vita-Mix’s common law rights had 
been infringed, the Circuit first had to determine whether Vita-Max 
actually had common law protection as to “5000.”281 Vita-Mix had the 
                                                          
 270. See id. at 968 (citing Briggs v. Pa. R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948) (noting 
“an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by 
an appellate court”)). 
 271. Id. at 969.  The district court noted that International Walkie Talkie had filed 
thirteen civil actions and six bankruptcies, all of which were ultimately dismissed for 
failure to state a claim or for want of prosecution.  Id. at 968. 
 272. Id. at 969–70. 
 273. Id. at 970. 
 274. 581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 275. Id. at 1320, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. 
 276. Id. at 1320–21, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342–43. 
 277. Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343. 
 278. U.S. Registration No. 2021896 (Dec. 10, 1996). 
 279. Vita-Mix, 581 F.3d at 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.  Nor has Vita-Mix 
tried to trademark any of its other products with numeric names, e.g., the  
“VITA-MIX 3600,” the “VITA-MIX 4500,” or the “VITA-MIX 5200.”  Id. at 1330,  
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350. 
 280. Id. at 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.  
 281. Id. at 1329–30, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. 
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burden of proving that “5000” was inherently distinctive or had 
acquired secondary protection.282 
It is a well-established principle in trademark law that model 
numbers—i.e., numbers that serve as grade designations rather than 
as source-indicators—are generally not protectable as trademarks.283  
Here, Vita-Mix admitted that it does not use the “5000” matter in 
commerce other than as VITA-MIX 5000 and “that the number 5000 
functions only to distinguish the blender from previous Vita-Mix 
[blenders] on the market.”284  The Circuit therefore concluded that 
Vita-Mix had no trademark rights in the “5000” literal matter to be 
protected from infringement.285  The Circuit went further to state 
that, like Vita-Mix, Basic had not used “5000” in a trademark sense 
either.  The court noted that Basic’s website referred to “5000” as a 
model number, and Basic’s product packaging for its “Blender 
Solutions” did not mention “5000” in the product name.286 
Vita-Mix argued that they were not required to show either that 
they had a valid trademark mark in “5000” or that Basic had used the 
“5000” in a source-indicating sense.287  Instead, Vita-Mix argued that it 
only had to prove that a likelihood of confusion had occurred 
between their 5000 “mark” and Basic’s 5000 “mark.”288  The Circuit 
quickly shredded this argument, opining, “Vita-Mix is incorrect as a 
matter of law” and “[w]ithout a protected trademark use, Vita-Mix 
cannot make a prima facie case of trademark infringement as a 
matter of law.”289 
                                                          
 282. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. 
 283. See In re Dana Corp., No. 655454, 1989 WL 274389, at *1, *3, *12, U.S.P.Q.2d 
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 286. Id. at 1331, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350.  Basic contended that the “5000” 
corresponded to a suggested price for the product, i.e., $50.00.  Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
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 287. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350. 
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F.  Statements of Use 
In In re Sones, 290 the Circuit vacated the TTAB’s decision upholding 
the Trademark Office’s refusal to register based on an insufficient 
specimen of use in commerce.291 
Michael Sones submitted an intent-to-use application for the mark 
ONE NATION UNDER GOD in connection with “charity 
bracelets.”292  After the mark had been published for public 
opposition, Sones submitted a Statement of Use with attendant 
specimens in the form of two web pages that indicate that  
“ONE NATION UNDER GODTM” charity bracelets could be added to 
a virtual shopping cart and purchased for two dollars each.293  
However, the web pages did not display any picture of the bracelets.294 
The Trademark Office refused registration, citing sections 
904.06(a)–(b) of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure 
(TMEP), which provides that catalogs or similar specimens, such as a 
display, associated with the offered goods “include[] a picture of the 
relevant goods.”295  The Office invited Sones to submit a substitute 
alternative specimen that included a picture of the Applicant’s goods 
along with the mark, which Sones did not do.296  The Board upheld 
the Office’s refusal, noting that Sones’s specimens did not offer a 
photograph of the mark displayed with a picture of the goods.297 
Sones appealed to the Circuit, asserting that the Trademark Office 
had improperly exacted a “bright-line rule” that specimens of use 
comprising website images must include a picture of the goods.298  
The court proclaimed that it could “see no reason why websites must 
necessarily have pictures to associate a trademark with the goods 
being sold.”299  The Circuit noted that the Trademark Office’s 
photograph requirement for web-based specimens of use seemed to 
                                                          
 290. 590 F.3d 1282, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 291. Id. at 1289, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119. 
 292. Id. at 1283, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119. 
 293. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119–20. 
 294. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 295. Id. at 1284–85, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 296. Id. at 1283–84, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 297. Id. at 1284, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.  Sones decided not to submit a 
substitute specimen, one assumes, because he did not possess a specimen that 
included the actual bracelets prior to his Statement of Use filing date.  On the same 
day that the Board ruled against his application, Sones filed a use-based application 
for the mark “ONE NATION UNDER GOD” for “charity bracelets” and submitted a 
picture of the bracelets next to the word ONE NATION UNDER GOD with relevant 
ordering information.  This time, however, Sones listed his first use date as January 
23, 2008. Id. at n.2, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 298. Id. at 1284, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 299. Id. at 1288, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123. 
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be borne of the Office’s misunderstanding of Lands’ End, Inc. v. 
Manbeck.300 
In Lands’ End, the district court analyzed a specimen of use for the 
mark “KETCH” in connection with purses.301  Lands’ End, the mail 
order clothing company, submitted a specimen comprised of a page 
of its catalog that showed a picture of a purse, a description of the 
purse, and displayed the applied-for mark.302 The Lands’ End district 
court found that this specimen was an acceptable specimen of use 
because it constituted a point of sale display of the mark in 
connection with the goods in question.303  The district court 
specifically noted that it was finding that the KETCH specimen was a 
point of sale display because “Lands’ End’s use of the term KETCH—
with the picture of the purse and corresponding description—
constitutes a display associated with the goods,” and further noted 
that the catalog pages included both a photograph and description of 
the goods.304 
Inspired by the district court’s Lands’ End decision, the Trademark 
Office rewrote its TMEP to include sections discussing requirements 
for catalogs.305  The Trademark Office stated that an Applicant’s 
catalog will qualify as a valid specimen of use if:  “(1) it includes a 
picture of the relevant goods, (2) it includes the mark sufficiently 
near the picture of the goods . . . , and (3) it includes information 
necessary to order the goods.”  For a catalog to qualify as a valid 
specimen of use, the Office required the Applicant to:  (1) “include a 
picture of the relevant goods;” (2) [“show] the mark sufficiently near 
the picture of the goods;” and (3) include ordering information.306 
The Circuit asserted that the Board’s photograph requirement had 
“no basis in trademark statue or policy.”307  Accordingly, it held that 
“the test for an acceptable website-based specimen, just as any other 
specimen, is simply that it must in some way evince that the mark is 
‘associated’ with the goods and serves as an indicator of source.”308  
The Circuit asserted that in making this determination, the Office 
should consider whether the web pages in the application “have a 
‘point of sale nature’ . . . and whether the . . . inherent characteristics 
                                                          
 300. Id. at 1285, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121 (citing Lands’ End, Inc. v. 
Manbeck, 797 F. Supp. 511, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314 (E.D. Va. 1992)). 
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of the goods are recognizable from the textual description” 
provided.309  Accordingly, the Circuit vacated and remanded back to 
the Board to reconsider Sones’s specimen of use.310 
CONCLUSION 
2009 signified a year of pruning back against what the Circuit 
seemed to feel was overreaching by lower tribunals, particularly as to 
the TTAB.  The court issued nine precedential decisions.311  For the 
trademark bar, it was a banner year at the Circuit, with the court 
raising the standard for finding fraud on the Trademark Office in 
Bose,312 mandating that the Office hold proportionality paramount in 
foreign equivalent determinations in Spirits,313 and lowering the 
standard for web-based specimens for goods in Sones.314 
                                                          
 309. Id. at 1289, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.  The Federal Circuit noted that 
“charity bracelet” is listed in the Trademark Officer’s Acceptable Identification of 
Goods and Services Manual and seemed to suggest that the usage of this term meant 
that the Applicant need not provide any additional language in order to constitute a 
point of sale, even in the absence of a photograph of the goods.  Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d at 
1124 (stating “the more standard the product, the less comprehensive the textual 
description need be”). 
 310. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.  Federal Circuit Judge Newman dissented 
from the decision, asserting that the appeal should have been dismissed as moot 
because of Sones’s second application for the ONE NATION UNDER GOD mark.  
Id. at 1289–90, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124–25 (Newman, J., dissenting).  Newman 
asserted that the Circuit’s decision was but “an elaborate opinion [] on a non-issue 
for an absent controversy[,]” because Sones’s second application “complied” with the 
Office’s photograph requirement.  Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.  The majority 
felt this second application did not moot the appeal because the second application 
provided a later constructive use date.  Id. at 1289 n.1, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at  
1124–25. 
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